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Abstract
Economists and sociologists disagree over markets' potential to substitute for per-
sonal connections. We study a model of labor markets where social ties are stronger
between similar individuals, and ¯rms prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire
on the open market. Workers in the market can take a costly action that can signal
their productivity. The paper asks whether signaling reduces the reliance on the net-
work. We ¯nd that the network is remarkably resilient. Signaling is caught in two
contradictory requirements: to be informative it must be expensive, but if it expensive
it can be undercut by the network.
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1 Introduction
Personalized networks, systems of personal connections that function as privileged chan-
nels of information and trust, are part of daily experience. In situations where the reliability
of information is particularly important (when applying for a job, when needing fresh capital
for a new enterprise, when moving to a new country, when substituting for formal enforce-
ment), their role becomes often crucial, either as means of entering formal markets, or indeed
as substitutes for these markets. Hence the ethnic enclaves, both residential and professional,
in New York City; the economic weight of the Overseas Chinese in their countries of res-
idence; the success of Medieval networks of merchants, organized along ethnic or religious
lines (the Armenians, the Italians, the Jews, the Dutch...). All of these phenomena have in
common the essential role played by the personal network, with its rapidity and its freedom
from the constraints of unwieldy procedures.1
As the function of the network is recognized, an important policy question is the extent to
which market mechanisms can substitute for personal connections. The question is important
both because the networks are often very successful, and thus it would be good to be able
to copy them, and because they are by their nature exclusionary, and thus tend to generate
resentment and opposition among those excluded. If the networks could be replicated, these
delicate distributional problems could be faced.
Economists and sociologists usually disagree on the potential for arti¯cial replication
of the networks. Not surprisingly, economists tend to be more optimistic, believing that
appropriate market mechanisms, encouraged and supported by appropriate policy where
necessary, can substitute for the missing personal channels. Sociologists, on the other hand,
see the personal, non-anonymous link as the essence of the relation, the fundamental, in-
escapable reason not only for the truthful transmission of information, but for the \trust"
1See, among many others, Braudel (1982), Greif (1993), Kotkin (1993), Rauch (2001), and Redding
(1990). The classic studies of personal referrals in labor markets are Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1974). A
large literature focussing on labor markets has emerged since, starting with Saloner (1985), Holzer (1988),
Staiger (1990), Montgomery (1991), and Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994). Ioannides and Datcher Loury
(2004) provides an exhaustive review.
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that accompanies the exchange.2
In this paper, we approach the issue by focusing on one channel of information transmis-
sion that seems a plausible alternative to personalized exchanges taking place in a network:
the possibility of signaling. Individuals who are not part of the network can take a costly
action that signals high productivity, the only relevant information in our model. The ques-
tion we ask is how e®ective the availability of the signal is in weakening the reliance on the
network. We ¯nd that the network is extremely resilient; for the majority of our parameter
space, reliance on the network continues and is pro¯table, even though signaling takes place
in the market and typically leads to more precise information than is being revealed in the
network. The reason is, ex post at least, obvious: when signaling is informative, it is caught
in two contradictory requirements. On one hand, it must be e®ective in separating the di®er-
ent types: it must induce the more productive type to signal while the less productive type
cannot pro¯tably do so. To induce this separation, either the signal is extremely precise, or
it must be costly. But at the same time, signaling is competing with reliance on the network;
if signaling is costly enough to di®erentiate among types, then the network is likely to be
pro¯table because it can undercut the cost of information in the market. Indeed, the savings
can be enough to expand the network beyond what the acquisition of useful information
would dictate, where ¯rms prefer hiring through the network, even when that implies a more
than average probability of hiring a less productive worker.
In the next section, we describe the model, in section 3 we describe the main properties
of the network that will be exploited repeatedly in solving the model, section 4 characterizes
the equilibria of the model, ¯rst without and then with signaling, section 5 discusses the
resilience of the network and its causes, section 6 describes the main empirical predictions
of the model, and section 7 concludes. Most proofs can be found in the Appendix available
at (website version address).
2See, for example, Tienda and Raijman (2001), discussing Rauch.
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2 The Model
A model allowing us to study the relative performance of personal connections versus
signaling must be very °exible. It must include both a network and a market, which must
di®er in some substantive way, and it must capture the equilibrium e®ects linking the two;
it must allow workers and ¯rms to choose between networking and signaling, and it must be
tractable enough to allow us to study the results' sensitivity to di®erent costs of signaling
and di®erent precisions of the two mechanisms. Montgomery (1991) proposed a simple,
beautiful model that satis¯es all our requirements. We start from a streamlined version of
Montgomery's set-up and add the possibility of signaling.
There is a potentially in¯nite number of identical in¯nitely-lived ¯rms and, at any period
in time, two overlapping generations of workers, each composed of an equal large number
of individuals. Everything we write below will apply to the limit of this number becoming
very large. Each ¯rm employs at most one worker. Workers live two periods, and work
in the second period of their lives. In each generation, half of the workers are productive
and produce one unit of output when employed (H workers), and half are unproductive and
produce no output (L workers). The two types of workers cannot be distinguished ex ante,
and wages cannot be made conditional on production. We will call \H ¯rms" ¯rms whose
current employee is of type H, and \L ¯rms" ¯rms whose current employee is of type L.
Young workers, who are not yet employed, can establish a connection to an older employed
worker at no cost. Employed workers' types are not observable outside the ¯rm, but following
Montgomery and building on sociologists' concept of \in-breeding," we assume that a young
individual will have a higher probability of establishing a link to an older worker of his own
type. More precisely, each young individual will be connected to an employed worker of his
own type with probability ® > 1=2, where ® is common knowledge. The links are otherwise
random.
Personal connections can be valuable because ¯rms have the option of hiring their new
workers through referrals from their current employees, whose productivity is known and
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who, through ®, are more likely than not to have connections to young workers of their own
type. If a ¯rm chooses to hire through referrals, its employee transmits the o®er to one of
the young workers he is connected to (choosing randomly if he has several connections). If
the young worker accepts the o®er, the contract is concluded and the worker is hired for the
next period. Young workers who either reject the referral o®er or do not receive any will need
to ¯nd employment in the anonymous market. Before entering the market, however, each
young worker has the option of engaging in a costly action that has the potential to announce
publicly that he is of type H; for example a worker can attempt to be certi¯ed through an
exam. Certi¯cation costs ¸ and the probability of success is ¯ > 1=2 if the individual is of
type H, and (1 ¡ ¯) < 1=2 if he is of type L.3 Failure at the exam is not observed, and
the market cannot distinguish between workers who are not certi¯ed because they never
attempted certi¯cation and those who tried but failed. We call this option \signaling,"
because it has the core properties of e®ective signaling strategies: a costly action whose
expected return is higher for type H.
Finally, the markets for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers open, and all young workers
who have not been hired though referrals o®er their labor. Firms can enter these markets
freely, and expected pro¯ts from market hiring are brought down to zero. Once the new
workers are hired, the old workers retire, and a new generation of young agents is born, not
yet working but ready to network.
The solution of the model is straightforward, once the stochastic properties of the network
have been characterized. We begin then by studying the network, in particular the density
of connections at each node that determines the probabilities of contacts between young and
old workers of the two types.
3Workers can borrow ¸ at no cost against their future labor earnings. More generally, ¸ is the amount
that will need to be repaid out of future wages if a worker decides to signal. Hence it could include borrowing
costs, and a decline in ¸ could be interpreted as, for example, more generous conditions on loans ¯nancing
extra schooling.
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3 The Network
Because establishing a personal connection entails no cost and does not prevent the option
of signaling later, doing so is a weakly undominated strategy; if the young worker does not
receive a referral o®er, or if the o®er is inferior to the market wage, he can access the market.
Thus we will study scenarios where all young workers establish a personal connection.
The stochastic nature of the connections implies that in general some older workers will
have several links, while others will have none. Suppose a young worker is connected to an
old worker of type i (i = H;L), employed by a ¯rm who has chosen to make a referral o®er.
What is the probability that the young worker will receive the o®er? We begin our analysis
of the network by deriving such a probability, which we call pi. The details of the derivation
are in the Appendix, available at (website version address), but the main steps are easily
described. With a very large number of workers and ¯rms, the density of connections at each
old worker node can be studied independently of the rest of the network. Suppose the size
of each generation of workers is 2N , which then equals the number of active ¯rms. Begin
by concentrating on pH : the probability that a young worker connected to an old worker
of type H will receive an o®er, conditional on the old worker's ¯rm having decided to use
referrals. Any young H worker has probability (®=N) of connecting to any speci¯c old H
worker, while the same probability equals (1 ¡ ®)=N for any young L worker. For large
N , the number of ties connecting any individual old worker to young workers of either type
is described by a Poisson distribution: the probability that an old H worker has x ties to
young H workers, for example, is given by ®
x
x!
e¡®. Denote by °k;H the probability that the
old worker to whom the young worker is connected has k additional connections to workers
of either type. Then °k;H can be written as
°k;H =
kX
j=0
·
®k¡j
(k ¡ j)!e
¡® (1¡ ®)j
j!
e¡(1¡a)
¸
=
kX
j=0
·
e¡1
®k¡j(1¡ ®)j
(k ¡ j)!j!
¸
=
e¡1
k!
(1)
6
where we have used4
1
k!
=
kX
j=0
®(k¡j)(1¡ ®)j
j!(k ¡ j)! :
Therefore, taking into account that the old worker chooses randomly,
pH = lim
N!1
·
1¡
µ
2N ¡ 1
2N
°2N¡1;H +
2N ¡ 2
2N ¡ 1°2N¡2;H + :::+
1
2
°1;H
¶¸
=
= lim
N!1
Ã
1¡
2N¡1X
k=1
k
k + 1
°k;H
!
= 1¡ e¡1
"
lim
N!1
Ã
2N¡1X
k=1
k
(k + 1)!
!#
:
It is possible to show that
lim
N!1
Ã
2N¡1X
k=1
k
(k + 1)!
!
= 1;
and thus we can conclude
pH = 1¡ e¡1: (2)
Notice that pH does not depend on the parameter ®, the in-breeding bias; as shown
in (1), ® a®ects the composition of the pool of young workers connected to a given old H
worker, but not the size of the pool. Thus it is also the case that pH = pL, and in what
follows we will identify both terms by p ´ 1 ¡ e¡1. Recall however that p is conditional
on the ¯rms using referrals and that H and L young workers will expect to be connected
to ¯rms of di®erent types, ¯rms generally making di®erent decisions about their reliance on
referrals. In equilibrium the unconditional probability of receiving a referral o®er will not
be equal for young workers of type H and L and will not be independent of ®.
The stochastic nature of the network determines two further probabilities that will be
exploited repeatedly. It is convenient to derive them here. We observed above that some
old workers will have no ties to any young worker. Thus, from the point of view of the ¯rm,
what is the probability that its current employee of type i is able to recommend at least one
worker for possible hiring? In other words, what is the probability that the ¯rm's current
4Since:
Pk
j=0
¡
k
j
¢
®(k¡j)(1¡ ®)j =Pkj=0 k!j!(k¡j)!®(k¡j)(1¡ ®)j = 1.
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employee has at least one connection? Call such a probability Ái where i is the current
employee's type. An old H worker is linked to a young H with probability ®=N (since there
are N old H workers). Thus the probability that he has no connection to any young H
is given by (1 ¡ ®=N)N , the exponent now re°ecting the fact that there are N young H
workers. The probability that he has no connection to either a young H or a young L is
then (1 ¡ ®=N)N [1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)=N ]N , and thus ÁH ; the probability that he has at least one
connection, can be approximated by
ÁH = lim
N!1
[1¡ (1¡ ®
N
)N(1¡ 1¡ ®
N
)N ] = 1¡ e¡1: (3)
Similarly ÁL = 1¡ e¡1, and again we will identify both ÁH and ÁL by Á ´ 1¡ e¡1.5
Finally, conditional on having at least one connection, what is the probability that an old
H worker making a random referral will choose a young worker of type H? Suppose that the
old H worker has k connections, and call such a probability ³kHH . Recall that the probability
of having k connections can be approximated by °kH in (1). Hence, for very large N , we can
write
³kHH =
µ
1
°kH
¶ kX
j=0
·µ
k ¡ j
k
¶
®k¡j
(k ¡ j)!e
¡® (1¡ ®)j
j!
e¡(1¡a)
¸
=
kX
j=0
·µ
k ¡ j
k
¶
®k¡j
(k ¡ j)!
(1¡ ®)j
j!
¸
k!:
Using
kX
j=0
·
(k ¡ j) ®
k¡j
(k ¡ j)!
(1¡ ®)j
j!
¸
=
®
(k ¡ 1)! ;
the expression simpli¯es to
³kHH =
µ
®
k(k ¡ 1)!
¶
k! = ® 8k: (4)
5Notice that there is no reason why p and Á should be equal in general, and indeed they would di®er if
either group of workers did not network with probability 1. (See Casella and Hanaki 2005).
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If we de¯ne ³kij as the probability that an old worker of type i having k connections and
making a random referral will choose a young worker of type j, the same procedure allows
us to derive immediately that ³kHH = ³
k
LL = ®, and ³
k
HL = ³
k
LH = 1¡ ® for all k.
It is the simple characterization of these probabilities that makes the model tractable.
The network, random but with a bias, combines the simplicity of purely random networks
with the substantive concerns raised by in-breeding and selectivity.6
4 The Equilibria of the Model
Given our focus on equilibria where all workers establish personal connections, the only
decision workers have to take is whether to attempt certi¯cation if they are not hired through
referrals. The ¯rms, on the other hand, have to decide whether or not to attempt to hire
through referrals of their current employee, and if so, what wage to o®er. Each worker i's
strategy is the probability with which he chooses to signal, si, while each ¯rm j's strategy
is the probability with which the ¯rm chooses to hire through referrals (conditional on its
current employee being connected to at least one young worker) rj and the referral wage wrj.
We focus on symmetrical equilibria where all workers of the same type and all ¯rms employing
the same type of workers follow the same strategy. In addition, given the stationarity of our
set-up, we restrict attention to stationary strategies that remain unchanged over time.7 If we
use the terminology \ 8i 2 H" to indicate all workers of type H, and \8j 2 H" to indicate
all ¯rms employing workers of type H (and similarly for L), then: sHi = sH 8i 2 H, sLi = sL
8i 2 L, rHj = rH and wrHj = wrH 8j 2 H, rLj = rL and wrLj = wrL8j 2 L. We neglect
the time subscript to emphasize that these strategies hold for all times. Call wC and wU the
wage for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers in the anonymous market. An equilibrium is a set
6An interesting related literature studies the economic implications of di®erent network architectures and
thus di®erent paths for the transmission of information. Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) and Tassier
and Menczer (2006) are examples focused on labor markets.
7All workers decide whether or not to signal only once, in the second and last period of their lives. Firms
on the other hand are in¯nitely-lived and must decide whether or not to hire through referrals every period.
By restricting attention to stationary strategies, we reduce the set of strategies for a ¯rm of each type to a
single probability, ignoring time.
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of strategies fsH , sL, rH , rL, wrH , wrLg, a pair of market clearing wages fwC , wUg, and a
set of beliefs about the workers' types such that no worker and no ¯rm can strictly gain from
choosing a strategy di®erent from that assigned to his or its type; the labor market clears,
and all beliefs are rational.
Consider a scenario where ¯rms extend referral o®ers with probabilities rH and rL, and
workers who have not been hired through referrals attempt certi¯cation with probabilities
sH and sL. For generic values of these probabilities, we can derive equilibrium wages and
¯rms' pro¯ts. Di®erent values of fsH , sL, rH , rLg can then be posited, and the appropriate
incentive compatibility constraints will identify the range of parameter values for which the
positited strategies constitute an equilibrium.
Examine the problem ¯rst from the perspective of the ¯rms. The workers they hire in
any given period are valuable both because of their own productivity and because of their
ties to younger workers in the future which will enable the ¯rm to hire through referrals, if
advantageous. Call VH the value of hiring a H worker, and ¦H the ¯rm's expected pro¯ts
from referrals from a current H employee (and similarly for VL and ¦L). Then
VH = 1 +maxf0; ±¦Hg
(5)
VL = maxf0; ±¦Lg
where ± is the rate with which expected pro¯ts in the next hiring cycle are discounted.
Keeping in mind that pro¯ts from hiring in the market must be zero, expected pro¯ts from
referrals must equal the probability of hiring a worker whose value, combining productivity
and future referrals, is larger than the referrals wage. If we call hLH the probability of hiring
a L worker through referrals from a current H employee (and similarly for the other types),
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then expected pro¯ts from referrals are
¦H = hHH(VH ¡ wrH) + hLH(VL ¡ wrH)
(6)
¦L = hHL(VH ¡ wrL) + hLL(VL ¡ wrL)
where the results of the previous section imply
hHH = hLL = ®Á = ®(1¡ e¡1)
(7)
hLH = hHL = (1¡ ®)Á = (1¡ ®)(1¡ e¡1):
Any ¯rm that attempts to hire through referrals o®ers a wage that must be weakly
smaller than the expected value of the referral. The wage must be acceptable to a H worker;
indeed, it must be the lowest wage acceptable to a H worker and it must be identical for
H and L ¯rms: wrH = wrL ´ wr.8 When some of the workers attempt certi¯cation, two
di®erent markets exist, a market for certi¯ed workers that clears at wage wC , and a market for
uncerti¯ed workers that clears at wage wU . The extent to which the referral wage re°ects the
wage for uncerti¯ed or certi¯ed workers (net of certi¯cation costs) depends on the strategy
followed by H workers left in the market. Since a H worker attempting certi¯cation is
successful with probability ¯, the lowest referral wage he would accept must be
wr =
8><>:¯wC + (1¡ ¯)wU ¡ ¸ if sH = 1wU otherwise. (8)
The market wages re°ect the probabilities and the values of hiring workers of either type.
8Because several young workers may be competing for the same referral o®er, the model gives all bar-
gaining power to the ¯rms. However, allowing workers to share in the expected pro¯ts from referrals leaves
the logic of the model unchanged, beyond the predictable shift in distribution See Casella and Hanaki.
Even when L ¯rms choose to use referrals, and thus VL > 0, they must be driven by the goal of hiring a H
worker since L workers are not productive. If workers shared in the surplus generated by referral hiring, the
wages o®ered by H and L ¯rms would both be higher than the minimum acceptable wage for a H worker but
they would di®er, re°ecting the di®erent probabilities of hiring H workers and thus the di®erent expected
surplus.
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De¯ne hHU as the probability of hiring a H worker in the market for uncerti¯ed workers
(and similarly hLU), and hHC and hLC as the corresponding probabilities in the market for
certi¯ed workers. Then, keeping in mind that expected pro¯ts when hiring in the market
are zero,
wU = hHUVH + hLUVL = hHUVH + (1¡ hHU)VL = hHU(VH ¡ VL) + VL
wC = hHCVH + hLCVL = hHCVH + (1¡ hHC)VL = hHC(VH ¡ VL) + VL:
The probability of hiring workers of either type in the two markets is given by the relative
frequencies of such workers. For example, if we de¯ne ¹CjH (¹CjL) as the probability of being
in the market for certi¯ed workers conditional on being a H type (a L type), then
hHC =
¹CjH(1=2)
¹CjH(1=2) + ¹CjL(1=2)
where 1=2 is the unconditional frequency of H and L types in the population of young
workers. Note that ¹CjH is the joint probability of not having been hired through referrals
and being certi¯ed, conditional on being a H worker (and correspondingly for ¹CjL). Thus,
¹CjH = [1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](sH¯)
¹CjL = [1¡ rH(1¡ ®)p¡ rL®p]sL(1¡ ¯):
Therefore,
wC =
[1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](sH¯)(VH ¡ VL)
[1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](sH¯) + [1¡ rH(1¡ ®)p¡ rL®p]sL(1¡ ¯) + VL: (9)
Similarly,
hHU =
¹U jH(1=2)
¹U jH(1=2) + ¹U jL(1=2)
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and
¹U jH = [1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](1¡ sH¯)
¹U jL = [1¡ rH(1¡ ®)p¡ rL®p][1¡ sL(1¡ ¯)]:
Therefore,
wU =
[1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](1¡ sH¯)(VH ¡ VL)
[1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p](1¡ sH¯) + [1¡ rH(1¡ ®)p¡ rL®p][1¡ sL(1¡ ¯)] + VL: (10)
(Recall that p = 1¡ e¡1).
We can now write the incentive compatibility constraints for ¯rms and workers. Firms
will use referrals only if it pro¯table to do so, or, taking (6) and (7) into account,
rH > 0, ¦H = (1¡ e¡1)[®VH + (1¡ ®)VL ¡ wr] ¸ 0
(11)
rL > 0, ¦L = (1¡ e¡1)[(1¡ ®)VH + ®VL ¡ wr] ¸ 0:
Workers will attempt certi¯cation if the cost of doing so is compensated by the di®erence
in the wages, or, given the di®erent probabilities of success for H and L workers,
sH > 0, ¯wC + (1¡ ¯)wU ¡ ¸ ¸ wU
(12)
sL > 0, (1¡ ¯)wC + ¯wU ¡ ¸ ¸ wU :
The characterization of the economy is complete: the three di®erent wages are given by
(8), (9) and (10), the ¯rms' pro¯ts from referrals by (6), the value to the ¯rm of hiring a
worker of either type by (5), and ¯nally the incentive compatibility constraints by (11) and
(12). If all incentive compatibility constraints hold with strict inequality, the equilibrium is
in pure strategies, and the probabilities frH , rL, sH , sLg assume only 0 or 1 values; otherwise
mixed strategies are possible.
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As described earlier, once a candidate set of equilibrium strategies is posited, the incentive
compatibility constraints, evaluated at the correct wages, identify the range of parameter
values for which the strategies are indeed an equilibrium, if one such range exists. Di®erent
equilibria can exist for di®erent parameter values, or indeed multiple equilibria can occur
over the same range of parameters. The number of candidate equilibria is large, but some
combinations of strategies can be ruled out ex ante. We can state,
Lemma 1. (i) If sH = sL = 0, then rH = 1 and rL = 0; (ii) If rL > 0, then rH = 1;
(iii) If sL > 0, then sH = 1; (iv) if sH 2 (0; 1), then rH = 1.
The lemma is proved in the Appendix,9 but the logic behind the four observations is not
di±cult to see. The ¯rst point states that in the absence of signaling H ¯rms strictly bene¯t
from hiring through referrals, while L ¯rms do not. The reason is that, absent signaling, H
¯rms have a higher probability of hiring a productive worker through referrals than in the
market, while the opposite is true for L ¯rms.10 The second point follows immediately from
the fact that it is always better to hire a H worker than a L worker; since the probability of
doing so through referrals is always higher for H ¯rms, the incentive to use referrals must
always be strictly higher for H ¯rms. Similarly, if any worker incurs the positive costs of
attempting certi¯cation, the market wage for certi¯ed workers must always be strictly higher
than the wage for uncerti¯ed workers, and since the probability of success, upon attempting
certi¯cation, is always higher forH workers, the incentive to signal must be strictly higher for
H workers. Finally, we know from (i) that H ¯rms always rely on referrals in the absence of
signaling. If sH 2 (0; 1), then sL = 0 (by (iii)), and ¯rms can o®er as referral wage the market
wage for uncerti¯ed workers. Because some H workers, and only some H workers, exit the
uncerti¯ed workers pool, the referral wage is lower than in the case of no signaling, while the
expected productivity of a referral hire for H ¯rms remains constant at ®. If referrals were
9Available at (website version address)
10The hiring decisions of H ¯rms are strategic complements. Given that other H ¯rms hire through
referrals, and L ¯rms do not, hHU < 1=2 < ®. Thus a H ¯rm bene¯ts from using referrals. For L ¯rms, it
is not di±cult to verify that in this scenario hHU > (1¡ ®) (see the Appendix available at (website version
address)). Thus it is preferable to hire in the market.
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pro¯table in the absence of signaling, they must be pro¯table when sH 2 (0; 1).
All remaining combinations of pure and mixed strategies could be analyzed systemati-
cally, and the range of parameter values supporting them identi¯ed, but given the equations
derived above, the procedure is mechanical and rather tedious. We limit ourselves to two
examples.
4.1 Example 1. Equilibrium with referrals and no signaling.
The workers' choice not to signal can be supported in equilibrium for all parameter
values: given ¸ > 0, o®-equilibrium beliefs on the part of the ¯rms according to which
anybody deviating must be an L type are su±cient to induce rational workers not to signal,
independently of their type. Lemma 1 states that in such a scenario, if an equilibrium
exists it must be such that H ¯rms use referrals while L ¯rms do not. The question then is
the identi¯cation of the range of parameter values, if any, for which these strategies are an
equilibrium. We can state,
Lemma 2. For all ® > 1=2, ¸ > 0, and ± 2 [0; 1], there exists an equilibrium where
sH = sL = 0, rH = 1 and rL = 0.
Proof. In principle, a ¯rm can envision any deviating path, extending into the future:
a once-for-all deviation where the ¯rm takes as given its own future strategy, a permanent
deviation where the ¯rm envisions changing its strategy forever, or indeed any repeated
deviation over any subset of future periods, and this for either of the ¯rm's future types.
In our stationary environment, however (where all other agents repeat the same strategy
and a single deviating ¯rm is negligible), the gain from repeated deviations is only the
appropriately discounted sum of the gain from a once-for-all deviation. Ruling out the latter
is thus su±cient to rule out any other pattern of deviation.11
11The question arises because a ¯rm's pro¯ts from deviation depend on the ¯rm's own future expected
strategies; the value of making referrals, which a®ect today's pro¯t from referrals, depends on the ¯rm's
future strategies. This leads to questioning whether a repeated or a permanent deviation could be more
advantageous that a once-for-all deviation. It is possible to show, however, that this is never the case, and
the conclusion in the text holds.
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Consider ¯rst the scope for deviation by a H ¯rm (the gain from foregoing referrals).
The ¯rm will deviate if current expected pro¯ts from referrals are negative, taking as given
its future strategy. Along the candidate equilibrium path, VL = 0 and the individual ¯rm's
deviation has no e®ect on the market wage, and thus on the referral wage. Deviation is
pro¯table if ¦H = (1¡ e¡1)(®VH ¡ wr) < 0, or substituting sH = sL = rL = 0, rH = 1 and
p = 1¡ e¡1 in (10), if
(1¡ e¡1)
µ
®¡ e¡ ®(e¡ 1)
e+ 1
¶
VH < 0:
But VH ¸ 1 and the second parenthesis is positive for all ® > 1=2. Deviation cannot be
pro¯table.
Consider now the gain from deviation for a L ¯rm (the gain from switching to using
referrals). Again, given VL = 0 along the candidate equilibrium path, deviation is pro¯table
if
(1¡ e¡1)
µ
(1¡ ®)¡ e¡ ®(e¡ 1)
e+ 1
¶
VH > 0;
a condition that is violated for all ® > 1=2. Deviation by either type of ¯rm is then ruled
out.¤
This is the equilibrium discussed by Montgomery in his original paper. In the absence
of signaling, it is the unique equilibrium of the model (as implied by Lemma 1): H ¯rms
always attempt to hire through referrals and L ¯rms never do. Expected pro¯ts are zero for
L ¯rms, who hire on the open market, but are positive for H ¯rms and equal to the expected
pro¯ts from referral hiring. From (6),
¦H =
(e¡ 1)(2®¡ 1)
(1 + e)¡ ±(e¡ 1)(2®¡ 1) :
The value of hiring a H worker is given by
VH =
1 + e
(1 + e)¡ ±(e¡ 1)(2®¡ 1) ;
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and the wage by
wU = wr =
e¡ ®(e¡ 1)
(1 + e)¡ ±(e¡ 1)(2®¡ 1) :
As expected, the value of a H worker is higher than his personal productivity (VH > 1)
for all ® > 1=2 because employing a H worker leads to a higher than random chance of hiring
a H worker in the following period. This e®ect is more important the higher is ® (the higher
the probability that connected agents are of the same type) and the higher is ± (the less the
future is discounted). The pro¯t from referral hiring accrues entirely to the ¯rm and is given
by ¦H , an expression increasing in ® and ±, like VH and for the same reasons. The wage,
on the other hand, is declining in ®; it would equal 1=2 if ® equalled 1=2 because referral
hiring by H ¯rms would then not a®ect the average productivity of the market pool, but its
value falls monotonically at higher ® values, re°ecting the increased selection of young H
workers out of the market. Because the wage re°ects not only the probability but also the
value of hiring a H worker in the market, it is increasing in ±; it is higher the less the future
is discounted. Note that the expected wage is identical for H and L workers, a consequence
of the model granting all bargaining power to the ¯rm when hiring through referrals and a
conclusion that would be easily reversed in favor of a referral premium if referred workers
shared in the surplus.12
4.2 Example 2. Equilibrium with signaling and no referrals.
Can signaling support an equilibrium where referrals are not advantageous? Lemma 3
provides the answer:
Lemma 3. For all ® > 1=2, ± 2 [0; 1], there exists an equilibrium where sH = 1, sL = 0,
rH = 0 and rL = 0 if ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®) and (1¡ ¯)=(2¡ ¯) · ¸ · ¯=(2¡ ¯).
12If workers hired through referrals had more bargaining power than our model grants them, equilibrium
strategies would be unchanged, but their own wage would be higher than the market wage. The market
wage would be lower, re°ecting the lower value to the ¯rm of hiring a H worker, but would again depend
negatively on ®.
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Proof. In this scenario, all certi¯ed workers must necessarily be H types and ¯rms can,
if they so choose, guarantee themselves a new H worker.13 In the candidate equilibrium,
no pro¯ts are available to ¯rms though referral hirings, and VH = 1 and VL = 0. The
wages for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers are given by (9) and (10) above. Because all
certi¯ed workers are of type H, their value is fully re°ected in the market wage, wC = 1, and
wU = (1¡ ¯)=(2 ¡ ¯). The incentive compatibility constraints for the workers (12) impose
a ¯rst set of constraints on parameters:
sH = 1) ¯
2¡ ¯ ¸ ¸
(13)
sL = 0) 1¡ ¯
2¡ ¯ · ¸:
With ¯ > 1=2, there is a non-empty range of ¸ values for which the two constraints can both
be satis¯ed.
Consider the potential for deviation by the ¯rms. Any ¯rm willing to hire through refer-
rals would need to o®er a wage acceptable to H workers, who prefer to attempt certi¯cation.
Hence, from (8), wr = ¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)2=(2 ¡ ¯) ¡ ¸. Because the incentive to use referrals is
always larger for H ¯rms (see Lemma 1), ruling out deviation by a H ¯rm is su±cient to
rule out deviation by a L ¯rm. In addition, it is su±cient to focus on once-for-all deviations.
A H ¯rm will switch to using referrals if ¦H = (1 ¡ e¡1)[® ¡ wr] > 0. Thus equilibrium
requires
rH = 0) ¸ · ¯ + (1¡ ¯)
2
2¡ ¯ ¡ ® =
1¡ 2®+ ¯®
2¡ ¯ : (14)
Because (13) and (14) must both be satis¯ed, this equilibrium exists if (1¡¯) · (1¡2®+¯®),
or ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®).¤
Thus for a suitable range of parameter values, the candidate equilibrium indeed exists;
signaling provides separation of the workers' types, in the limited sense that all certi¯ed
13The only other candidate equilibrium where all certi¯ed workers are guaranteed to be of H type has
strategies sH 2 (0; 1) and sL = 0. But then we know by Lemma 1 that rH = 1, if an equilibrium exists,
referrals must take place.
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workers must be of type H, and ¯rms refrain from using referrals and prefer to hire in
the market, an option they would not take in the absence of signaling. Signaling provides
information and supplants the use of personal referrals. Notice that hiring in either market,
for certi¯ed or uncerti¯ed workers, leads to zero ¯rm pro¯ts, and thus ¯rms are indi®erent
between paying the premium attached to certi¯cation and guaranteeing themselves a H
worker, or hiring a cheaper uncerti¯ed worker with a lower but positive probability of being
a H type. But hiring an uncerti¯ed worker in this equilibrium is not equivalent to hiring
an uncerti¯ed worker when no signaling takes place; the more precise information re°ected
in the wage makes this option superior to referrals in this equilibrium but inferior when no
signaling takes place.
Notice however that the range of parameter values for which the equilibrium exists is
surprisingly limited. Since ® > 1=2, ¯ cannot be smaller than 2=3, and ¸ must fall in
a correspondingly narrow interval. Interestingly, the tight range of acceptable parameter
values is mostly dictated by the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that ¯rms refrain
from making referrals. In their absence, all values of ¯ > 1=2 could sustain the equilibrium
(although the range of acceptable ¸ values would remain quite small). This suggests two
conjectures: ¯rst it seems likely that other equilibria exist, for ranges of parameter values
that may di®er from or overlap the range identi¯ed here, where signaling provides separation
between the workers' types but ¯rms still choose to make referral o®ers,14 and second, that
the ¯rms' incentive compatibility constraints select values of ¸ close to the lower bound of
the interval satisfying the workers' incentive constraints. A higher ¸ would induce ¯rms
to deviate. This is an interesting point, beginning to suggest the resilience of referrals in
our model; when ¯ is not very high, signaling can be informative only if ¸ is high enough
to induce separation of workers' types, but if ¸ is high, signaling is informative but also
expensive since referral hiring can undercut it and be less precise but preferable. We make
14The existence of such equilibria does not follow immediately from a violation of the ¯rms' incentive
compatibility constraints in the candidate equilibrium studied. The composition of the markets, the wages
and thus all constraints would re°ect the di®erent ¯rms' strategies.
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this conjecture more precise in the next section.
5 Reliance on Personal Connections when Signaling is
Informative.
Having veri¯ed that signaling can come to eliminate the recourse to personal referrals, we
now focus on the opposite question. Under what conditions is the availability of a signaling
mechanism compatible with continued reliance on referrals? And if reliance on referrals
continues to exist, does signaling a®ect referrals indirectly, by in°uencing the quality of
referral hiring (i.e. the percentage of referrals falling on workers of di®erent type)?
Some scenarios are trivial. If the cost of signaling ¸ is very low, and the probability of
success ¯ not very di®erent across types (¯ close to 1=2), then all workers may choose to sig-
nal, but certi¯cation is uninformative and H ¯rms continue to prefer hiring through referrals
(and the more so the higher is ®). The question becomes interesting if we restrict attention to
equilibria where signaling is informative, and we use the strict criterion that only H workers
attempt to signal (sH > 0, sL = 0) because in these equilibria signaling is informationally
superior to referrals. The ¯rst result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For all ® 2 (1=2; 1), there exist equilibria where signaling is perfectly
informative and ¯rms strictly prefer to hire through referrals.
All the proofs of the results in this section can be found in the Appendix available at
(website version address). In the text we summarize the intuition behind the results. The
proof of Proposition 1 amounts to showing the existence of one equilibrium where signaling
is perfectly informative and ¯rms strictly prefer to hire through referrals. In particular, we
focus on the case ¯ = ® and on strategies fsH = 1, sL = 0, rH = 1, rL = 1g (H workers in
the market prefer to signal, L workers do not, and all ¯rms prefer to hire through referrals)
and show that for all ® 2 (1=2; 1) there exists a non-empty range of ¸ values for which such
strategies are indeed equilibrium strategies. The case ¯ = ® is chosen primarily because
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it simpli¯es the algebra and the presentation of the results, but is also a natural reference
point: the exogenous precision of the personal connections equals the exogenous precision
of the signal. The assumption does not imply that personal connections and signaling are
constrained to be equally informative because the signaling mechanism has one additional
element, the cost ¸, that leads to self-selection in the decision to engage in signaling, hence
the possibility that signaling be perfectly informative even for ¯ very close to 1=2, as in the
equilibrium described here. Because we are evaluating equilibria over the whole range of
possible ¸ values, the restriction ¯ = ® is compatible with a large number of scenarios while
leaving the model ex ante unbiased. We will use it repeatedly as our reference case.
Although the proof selects one particular example, in fact there are several equilibrium
regimes where signaling is informative and ¯rms prefer to use referrals: equilibria where only
H ¯rms use referrals, or where a share of them do so while L ¯rms hire in the market, or where
all H ¯rms and a share of L use referrals, or equilibria where only a share of H workers signal
while L workers do not. The range of parameter values for which referral hiring takes place
and is imprecise, while ¯rms could guarantee themselves H workers, is far from limited or
special. Figure 1 shows equilibrium strategies in ¸¡® space in the case ¯ = ® and ± = 0:90.
The model is obviously very stylized, but we can read parameter values keeping in mind that
the unit of time is the hiring cycle, or more precisely the length of employment of a worker at
a single ¯rm. The di®erence in productivity between a productive and unproductive worker
over that cycle is normalized to 1. Thus if we think of the time horizon as about ¯ve years,
± = 0:90 corresponds to a yearly discount rate of 2 percent.15 The parameter ¸, the ¯xed
cost of certi¯cation, can be thought of as the cost of further education, for example college,
and should be read relative to 1; ¸ = 1 in our model represents the case where the cost
of college education equals the total di®erence in productivity between a productive and a
non-productive worker over ¯ve years. As we saw, in the presence of referrals the value of
a worker to the ¯rm includes the value of future referral hiring, and thus the premium that
15Our qualitative results are e®ectively insensitive to the speci¯c value we assign to ±, for all ± 2 [0; 1].
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¯rms may be willing to pay to college educated workers may be well above the one-cycle
di®erence in productivity, implying in turn that acceptable values of ¸ in our model may
well be above 1.
Figure 1a depicts workers' strategies, and ¯gure 1b ¯rms' strategies. As mentioned earlier,
there is always an equilibrium without signaling, supported by ¯rms' negative o®-equilibrium
beliefs. In Figure 1a, we have allowed signaling to take place whenever it can be supported
in equilibrium with rational beliefs.16
The ¯gures show that there is a large area of the parameter space for which signaling
takes place and is fully informative. Workers signal when the cost ¸ is not too large. If
the precision of the signal (¯, which in the ¯gure equals ®) is high, only H workers signal,
and they do so for a large range of ¸ values; if on the contrary ¯ is low, then signaling can
occur only if ¸ is low, and for most of these values signaling is not informative because the
incentives to signal are very similar for H and L workers.17 Unless ¯ is high, informative
signaling requires intermediate values for ¸, low enough to be a®ordable by H workers, but
high enough to discourage L workers. As for referrals, the immediate observation from Figure
1b is that there is no equilibrium where ¯rms do not use referrals: over the entire parameters
range, referrals never cease to be pro¯table for ¯rms, whether signaling is informative or not,
whether ¸ is high or low, whether ® and ¯ are high or low. The ¯gure relies on ® = ¯, and
thus, as made clear by the equilibrium with no referrals characterized in the previous section,
the result is not general. However given our emphasis on the ® = ¯ case as plausible unbiased
reference, we emphasize this conclusion in a separate proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose ® = ¯. Then there exist equilibria where signaling is perfectly
informative, but there are no equilibria where referrals are not used.
16No signaling is the unique equilibrium in the area left white: a worker of either type would not want to
attempt certi¯cation even if ¯rms, o®-equilibrium, expected any certi¯ed worker to be of type H. A second
equilibrium, with sH 2 (0; 1) and sL = 0, exists in the region bordering the upward sloping frontier between
the white and gray areas in Figure 1a. The ¯gure omits it for ease of reading.
17When ¯ is close to 1=2, the probability of success upon signaling is very similar for H and L workers,
but the wage premium for certi¯ed workers is small. At high ¯, the premium is high but the probability of
success for a L worker is low. The incentive to signal for L workers is maximal for intermediate values of ¯.
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A moment of re°ection shows that the reason is obvious: unless ¯ is high, when signaling
is informative it is also rather expensive (¸ is high), expensive enough to allow H workers to
di®erentiate themselves. Market wages for certi¯ed workers compensate them for the cost
of certi¯cation, and thus tend to be high. Firms may well prefer the less informative but
cheaper reliance on referrals. In the trade-o® between information and cost, cost becomes
the deciding factor. The conclusion always holds when ® = ¯ because informative signaling
can be cheap only when its precision is high, but if the precision of referral hirings is also
correspondingly high, then the cost advantage, small at it may be, remains the dominant
consideration.
The ¯rms' equilibrium strategies are particularly interesting when ¯ (and ®) are low.
There is then a range of parameter values where, if signaling occurs in equilibrium, all
¯rms hire through referrals (the black area in ¯gure 1b), including L ¯rms, which never use
referrals in the absence of signaling because referrals give them a more than even chance of
hiring an unproductive worker. The observation deserves emphasizing in a separate remark.
Remark. Signaling, including informative signaling, may induce L ¯rms to hire through
referrals.
Once again, the reason is the market premium for certi¯ed workers. Indeed, Figure 1b
makes clear that such an equilibrium occurs when, for each ® and ¯, ¸ approaches its highest
acceptable value. Because certi¯ed workers must be compensated for the cost of signaling,
the areas where L ¯rms use referrals correspond to those ranges of parameter values where
the certi¯cation premium is highest. When ® = ¯, L ¯rms' incentive to use referrals is
maximal when ® is close to 1=2: the bias inherent in referral hiring is not too strong, while
referrals allow ¯rms to avoid the premium for certi¯ed workers and still hire workers of higher
the average productivity than in the uncerti¯ed market.
What is remarkable about this equilibrium is that the existence of signaling, and in
particular of informative signaling, leads to an increase in ¯rms' reliance on referrals. In
fact, if ® = ¯ signaling always weakly increases the expected proportion of workers hired
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through referrals; either referral hiring is used byH ¯rms alone, as in the absence of signaling,
or it is used by both H ¯rms and some positive share of L ¯rms (possibly all).
We can now address a question we raised at the beginning of this section: how does
signaling a®ect the quality of referral hiring? The answer is an immediate implication of our
previous remark.
Implication. Signaling always weakly lowers the quality of referral hirings.
Since only H ¯rms recur to referrals in the absence of signaling, any expansion of refer-
ral hiring to L ¯rms necessarily lowers the average productivity of workers hired through
referrals. Paradoxically then, signaling not only need not eliminate referrals, but in fact
may lead to increased reliance on personal connections, and lower expected productivity of
referral hires.
We have phrased our discussion mostly in terms of the ® = ¯ case, but the results
generalize predictably when we loosen this constraint. To generate transparent ¯gures, we
can specialize the model in a di®erent direction. Figure 2 describes equilibrium strategies
for workers (¯gure 2a) and ¯rms (¯gure 2b) for arbitrary values of ¯ and ¸ when we ¯x ® at
0:75 (and ± at 0:90, as earlier).18 Figure 2a is very similar to ¯gure 1a; signaling can occur
in equilibrium only if the cost ¸ is not too high, where the highest acceptable ¸ increases
with ¯, but if ¸ is low, both types of workers have an incentive to signal.19 The di®erence is
in ¯gure 2b. First, of all, there are now equilibria without referrals, when ¯ is high (higher
than ®) and ¸ low, the area left white in the lower right corner of the ¯gure. This is the
equilibrium with no referrals and informative signaling discussed in section 4.2, and a second
equilibrium with no referrals and all workers signaling when ¸ is particularly low. The low
18As in Figure 1a, a second equilibrium, with sH 2 (0; 1) and sL = 0, exists in the region bordering the
upward sloping frontier between the white and gray areas in Figure 2a. Again the ¯gure omits it for ease of
reading.
19The sensitivity of the acceptable ¸ range to ¯ is reduced, relative to the case where ® = ¯. At low ¯
but constant ® (and H ¯rms only using referrals), equilibrium market wages are lower than they would be
if ® equalled ¯, keeping certi¯cation valuable and raising the highest acceptable ¸. At high ¯, the e®ect
is reversed: with constant ®, smaller than ¯, market wages for uncerti¯ed workers are now higher and the
incentive to signal is reduced, reducing in turn the highest acceptable ¸.
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¸ makes the ¯rms' savings from referral hirings negligible, and the high ¯ makes signaling
a good channel of information, even in the absence of full separation.20 It is clear from the
¯gure though that even in the area where ¯ > ® (¯ > 0:75), the absence of referrals occurs
in a small subset of the parameter space. Second, the equilibrium where both H and L
¯rms rely on referrals now is concentrated mostly in an area of high ¯ and ¸ values. With
® = 0:75, L ¯rms are discouraged from using referrals unless the savings from doing so are
substantial: a range of high ¸ and ¯ where signaling still occurs, the certi¯cation premium
is high, and the composition of the uncerti¯ed labor pool worse than when hiring through
referrals.
We can now provide a summary answer to our original question: does the availability
of signaling lead ¯rms to forego referrals? More precisely, how large is the region of the
parameters space where equilibria without referrals can be supported? Figure 3 shows the
full three-dimensional picture, for ® and ¯ between 1=2 and 1, and ¸ between 0 and 2:5, with
± = 0:90.21 On the left-hand side, in grey, is the space where referrals do not take place, as
a function of the three parameters. Notice the two requirements ¯ > ® and, simultaneously,
¸ small. For comparison, the right-hand side shows the parameters space where signaling
takes place in equilibrium, a much larger fraction of the total space. The darker shade of
grey shows, in both cases, regions where signaling is exclusive to H workers; in the majority
of this space referrals continue to be employed.
A ¯nal but important note of caution. Throughout our discussion we have emphasized
how small is the range of parameters for which referrals cannot occur in equilibrium relative
to the full admissible space, but it is true of course that not all combinations of parameters
need be equally likely in reality. A more precise and more constructive reading of our results
then is as an invitation to empirical scholars, emphasizing the very speci¯c requirements on
20When onlyH workers signal, all certi¯ed workers must beH types, but the composition of the uncerti¯ed
labor pool and the di®erence in wages still depend on ¯. Similarly, when all workers signal, some L workers are
expected to become certi¯ed, but the composition of the two labor pools, and the wages, remain signi¯cantly
di®erent if ¯ is high enough.
21As mentioned earlier, results show little sensitivity to ±.
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parameters that are needed for signaling to supplant reliance on personal connections.
6 Discussion
We can ask other questions. For example, what is the e®ect of making certi¯cation
less expensive (reducing ¸)? Will personal connections become less important in labor
markets? According to our model, the answer is not immediate because it depends both
on the precision of the information inherent in the personal network and on the standards
used in certi¯cation. Lowering certi¯cation costs reduces the self-selection that limits L
workers' attempts to signal, and thus, ceteris paribus, reduces the information conveyed by
being certi¯ed. Only when the signal is in itself precise enough, relative to the network,
to limit the importance of this e®ect (when ¯ >> ®) does the cheap availability of public
information reduce the reliance on personal connections. The opposite option of making
certi¯cation more expensive (increasing ¸), relying then on the information provided by self-
selection, never reduces the use of personal referrals. On the contrary, it tends to increase the
use of referrals, even when they are known to lead to a less than average probability of hiring
productive workers. Similarly, what is the e®ect of increasing the standards for certi¯cation
(increasing ¯)? Again, the answer depends on other factors too. Only when certi¯cation is
both rigorous and cheap does it become a preferred option to personal referrals. We can
also interpret the parameter ® as correlated to the openness of a society; the more open and
diverse, the lower the \in-breeding bias" and the less predictable the \quality" of a personal
referral. Not surprisingly, the model tells that at high ®, in a predictable and segregated
society, it is very di±cult to substitute personal referrals with signaling; the information
transmitted through personal connections is just too cheap and too accurate. But as the
society becomes more open, diverse and mixed, that value of social contacts falls. With
appropriate institutions (with high ¯ and low ¸) signaling can emerge.
A more ambitious task is linking the results of our model to the regularities that have
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emerged from the empirical literature on the use of social contacts in labor markets.22 The
least controversial observation is the negative correlation between the use of social ties in
¯nding employment and the workers' education level (for example Staiger for the U.S., and
Pellizzari 2003 for European countries), an observation that ¯ts well the story told in this
model: incomplete information prevents the ¯rms' full knowledge of workers' characteristics,
and referrals and education are two alternative means of partly revealing such characteris-
tics. Referrals and education are substitutes, as they are in our model where workers hired
through referrals can forego the step of obtaining certi¯cation. In a particularly detailed data
set on Italian college graduates, a more speci¯c ¯nding is the reduced reliance on social ties
in professions like engineering and medicine, relative to social sciences or literature.23 Ac-
cording to our model, the di®erence can be read in terms of ¯: either because the standards
are tougher or because pro¯ciency is more precisely de¯ned, in medicine and engineering
certi¯cation is a more precise measure of skills (¯ is higher) than in social sciences or litera-
ture. At low ¸ (at low cost of public education in Italy), the di®erence has a direct impact
on the reliance on social ties.
The empirical ¯nding that has received most attention and has been most disputed is
the existence of a systematic premium paid to workers hired through referrals. A positive
premium was found ¯rst by the U.S. studies (for example, Granovetter 1974, Corcoran et al.
1980, Staiger 1990), but has since been disputed. Bentolilla et al. (2003) and Pistaferri
(1999) report a negative premium, while Pellizzari (2003) and Santamaria-Garcia (2003) ¯nd
no systematic relation once workers' and jobs' characteristics are controlled for.24 Figure 4
depicts the referral wage and the market wages in our model. The top row (¯gures 4a)
reports the referral wage and the average market wage as function of ¯, on the left, and as
function of ¸, on the right; the central row (¯gures 4b) distinguishes between the two market
22Again Ioannides and Datcher Loury provide a careful survey.
23See Sylos Labini (2004), based on the 1998 ISTAT Survey of Italian college graduates.
24Sylos Labini makes the interesting point that not all social ties are equivalent: family ties and professional
ties, in particular, may transmit quite di®erent information. In his analysis of Italian data on college
graduates, the negative premium is limited to jobs found through family ties.
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wages for certi¯ed and for uncerti¯ed workers, and the bottom row (¯gures 4c) compares
the referral wage to the average market wage of H workers and L workers separately.25 The
discontinuity points correspond to changes in equilibrium strategies, which can be read from
Figure 2; at high values of ¸ multiple equilibria are possible, as shown in all ¯gures on the
right-hand side of Figure 4. All the ¯gures support the di±culties found by researchers
in identifying a systematic bias. The ¯rst row of ¯gures suggests that if the referral wage
is simply compared to the average market wage (a not unreasonable comparison in our
model where there is only one type of job), the results are ambiguous; the direction of the
bias depends on parameters. If these parameters plausibly di®er across sectors and/or across
countries, the conclusion con¯rms the heterogeneity across sectors and countries found by the
literature. Controlling for the workers' characteristics ¯rst appears to yield cleaner results;
all referral o®ers are made to uncerti¯ed workers, and the premium, relative to the market
wage for uncerti¯ed workers only, is unambiguously positive (¯gures 4b). But certi¯cation in
our model is an imperfect signal of workers' productivity, and the fact that all referrals are
made to uncerti¯ed workers is an artifact of the timing of the model. A better analysis would
try to control for workers' unobservable characteristics, here their productivity. Figures 4c
show that the referral wage has a positive premium for L workers for most parameter values
(i.e. it is higher than the market wage they would expect to receive) but has a discount for
H workers. Again, as in the literature, the results are not consistent across di®erent groups
of workers, with discounts more probable in the case of more productive hires (as reported
by Pellizzari, for example). Of course we are aware that the model is extremely stylized and
these results, although suggestive, should be taken with care.
25The ¯gures should be read keeping in mind that the referral premium would be higher if workers hired
through referrals shared in the surplus.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has studied the extent to which ¯rms' and workers' reliance on networks of
personal connections as channels of information about jobs is weakened by the availability
of a signaling mechanism. The signaling mechanism is available to all but is costly, and its
outcome is an imperfect signal of the worker's true productivity. The network on the other
hand is free and connects a young worker to someone who is currently employed and whose
productivity is known by the ¯rm. Because connections are more likely between similar
agents, the existence of a tie provides information to the ¯rm about the productivity of
the young worker. We have found that although signaling can transmit information more
precisely because the cost induces workers to self-select, reliance on the network is very
robust; only for a very small fraction of the parameters space of the model do referrals
disappear.
The analysis was motivated by the desire to compare the network, possibly successful but
exclusionary, to a market mechanism, open to all and anonymous. In fact, to the extent that
they convey any information at all, both mechanisms must di®erentiate between di®erent
types of workers, a bias summarized in the model by the two parameters ® and ¯. In what
sense then is signaling in our model a \market mechanism" while the network is not? There
are two main di®erences. First, the cost involved in the decision to signal plays a central role
in the revelation of information, contrary to the case of free personal connections. Second,
the information revealed by the network is local, whereas the information transmitted by the
signal is global, a sentence that could be rephrased more precisely by plausibly de¯ning the
information as \veri¯able" in the signaling case, and \non-veri¯able" in the network case.
In our model, the implication is that in the market ¯rms compete for the surplus from the
revelation of information, but they do not in the network. It is the ¯rms' open entry into
the market that at the end fundamentally distinguishes the two mechanisms.
Our analysis relies on the cost advantage enjoyed by personal referrals. The advantage is
realistic; \free" connections, emerging naturally from social and family life, are exactly those
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singled out by sociologists as irreplaceable by more formal mechanisms. But in societies
where \networking" has become an intentional and costly activity, it remains important to
see how our conclusions are a®ected by the possibility of establishing connections at a cost.
We pursue this direction in a companion paper (see Casella and Hanaki).
We have not addressed the e±ciency of two mechanisms. In the model, referrals a®ect
distribution (distribution of pro¯ts betweenH and L ¯rms, between incumbent and potential
entrants, and of wages between di®erent workers) but do not a®ect e±ciency. All workers
are always employed and production always equals the total product of all H workers: there
is no e±ciency rationale to recommend shifting from one mechanism to another.26 We have
chosen this approach because real world objections to preferential networks are rarely based
on e±ciency; for the most part they stem from the belief that the network is advantageous
but exclusionary, and thus plays essentially an \unfair" redistributive purpose. It is this
role that is highlighted in the current analysis, although comparing the e±ciency of two
mechanisms is an interesting direction for future research.
Finally, other market-type mechanisms seem possible and interesting. The most obvious
one, closest in spirit to Rauch and to our knowledge neglected by the formal literature on
referrals in labor market, is a pro¯t-driven intermediary: an employment agency. How would
such an intermediary function in this model? Could it take over successfully the functions
ful¯lled by the network? Here, too, we leave the answer to future research.
26Indeed, strictly speaking, signaling is inferior to referrals because of the lost costs ¸. In a full model,
costs ¸ would be paid to an education sector.
30
References
Bentolilla, S., Michelacci, C., Su¶arez, J., 2003. Social contacts and occupational choice.
Working paper 0406, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros.
Braudel, F., 1982. The Wheels of Commerce, New York: Harper & Row.
Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M. O., 2004. The e®ects of social networks on employment
and inequality. American Economic Review 94, 426{454.
Casella, A., Hanaki, N., 2005. Costly transmission of information. A comparison of signals
and networks. mimeo, Columbia University.
Corcoran, M., Datcher, L., Duncan, G., 1980. Information and in°uence networks in labor
markets. In: Duncan, G., Morgan, J. N. (Eds.), Five Thousand American Families -
Patterns of Economic Progress, Vol. VIII, Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research, 1{37.
Feller, W., 1968. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Application, Vol. I, 3rd
Edition, New York: John Wilry & Sons, Inc.
Granovetter, M., 1974. Getting a Job, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Greif, A., 1993. Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The
Maghribi traders' coalition. American Economic Review 83, 525{548.
Holzer, H. J., 1988. Search method use of unemployed youth. Journal of Labor Economics
6, 1{20.
Ioannides, Y. M., Datcher Loury, L., 2004. Job information networks, neighborhood e®ects
and inequality. Journal of Economic Literature 42, 1056{1093.
Kotkin, J., 1993. Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Success in the New
Global Economy, New York: Random House.
31
Montgomery, J., 1991. Social networks and labor market outcomes: Toward an economic
analysis. American Economic Review 81, 1408{1418.
Mortensen, D. T., Vishwanath, T., 1994. Personal contacts and earnings - It is who you
know. Labor Economics 1, 187{201.
Pellizzari, M., 2003. Do friends and relatives really help in getting a good job? Ph.D. thesis,
London School of Economics.
Pistaferri, L., 1999. Informal networks in the Italian labor market. Giornale degli Economisti
e Annali di Economia 58, 355{375.
Rauch, J. E., 2001. Black ties only? Ethnic business networks, intermediaries, and African-
American retail entrepreneurship. In: Rauch, J. E., Casella, A. (Eds.), Networks and
Markets, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 270{309.
Redding, S. G., 1990. The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruter.
Rees, A., 1966. Information networks in labor markets. American Economics Review 56,
559{566.
Saloner, G., 1985. Old boy networks as screening mechanisms. Journal of Labor Economics
3, 255{267.
Santamaria-Garcia, J., 2003. Gathering information through social contacts: An empirical
analysis of labor market outcomes. mimeo, University of Alicante.
Staiger, D., 1990. The e®ect of connections on the wages and mobility of young workers.
Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Sylos Labini, M., 2004. Labor markets and social networks: The case of Italian young workers
with tertiary education. Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute.
32
Tassier, T., Menczer, F., 2006. Social network structure, segregation, and equality in a labor
market with referral hiring. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization forthcoming.
Tienda, M., Raijman, R., 2001. Ethnic ties and entrepreneurship. Comments on black ties
only. In: Rauch, J. E., Casella, A. (Eds.), Networks and Markets, New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 310{327.
33
A Appendix
Derivation of pH in Section 3.
The exact probability that an old worker of type H (of which N exist) has k connections
in addition to i's is given by:
e°k;H = kX
j=0
"µ
N ¡ 1
c
¶³ ®
N
´c ³
1¡ ®
N
´N¡1¡cµN
d
¶µ
1¡ ®
N
¶dµ
1¡ 1¡ ®
N
¶N¡d#
(A1)
where
c ´ min(k ¡ j;N ¡ 1)
d ´ min(j;N):
The Poisson approximation °k;H
°k;H =
kX
j=0
·
®k¡j
(k ¡ j)!e
¡® (1¡ ®)j
j!
e¡(1¡a)
¸
=
kX
j=0
·
e¡1
®k¡j(1¡ ®)j
(k ¡ j)!j!
¸
=
e¡1
k!
(A2)
is the limit of (A1) as N tends to in¯nity and has well established bounds of error. It can
be shown (Feller 1968, Ch.6) that
e¡®
®c
c!
e¡
c2
N¡c¡ ®
2
N¡® <
µ
N
c
¶³ ®
N
´c ³
1¡ ®
N
´N¡c
< e¡®
®c
c!
ec
®
N ;
implying that
lim
N!1
e°k;H = lim
N!1
°k;H
and therefore:
lim
N!1
Ã
1¡
2N¡1X
k=1
k
k + 1
e°k;H! = lim
N!1
Ã
1¡
2N¡1X
k=1
k
k + 1
°k;H
!
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(i.e. the error introduced by the approximation does not distort the sum).
The last part of the derivation in the text states without proof that
lim
N!1
Ã
2N¡1X
k=1
k
(k + 1)!
!
= 1:
To see this, begin by expanding ex:27
ex =
1X
k=0
xk
k!
= 1 + x+
1X
k=2
xk
k!
= 1 + x+ x
1X
k=1
xk
(k + 1)!
:
Di®erentiating both sides with respect to x,
(ex)0 = ex = 1 +
1X
k=1
xk
(k + 1)!
+ x
1X
k=1
kxk
(k + 1)!
;
or
ex = 1 + (ex ¡ x¡ 1)=x+ x
1X
k=1
kxk
(k + 1)!
:
Setting x = 1,
e = 1 + (e¡ 1¡ 1)=1 +
1X
k=1
k
(k + 1)!
;
or
1X
k=1
k
(k + 1)!
= 1:
¤
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) When sH = sL = 0,we can write
¦H = Á(VH ¡ VL)(®¡ hHU)
(A3)
¦L = Á(VH ¡ VL)(1¡ ®¡ hHU)
27We thank Peter S. Dodds for this proof.
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and
hHU =
1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p
2¡ rHp¡ rLp : (A4)
We proceed in two stages. First we show that (VH ¡ VL) > 0 always. Then we show that
¦H > 0 and ¦L < 0 always. (1) If rL < 1, VL = 0 and VH ¸ 1, hence (VH ¡ VL) > 0. If
rL = 1, there are two possibilities: (a) if rH < 1, then ¦H = 0 and VH = 1. In this case,
VL = ±Á(1 ¡ ® ¡ hHU)=(1 ¡ ±®) < 1 for all ± · 1. Hence (VH ¡ VL) > 0. (b) If rH = 1
and ¦H > 0, then, by (5) and (A3) above, (VH ¡ VL) = 1 + ±Á(VH ¡ VL)(2® ¡ 1) > 0.
Thus we can conclude that in all cases, (VH ¡ VL) > 0. (2) From (A4), @hHU=@rH < 0,
and @hHU=@rL > 0. Thus hHU is maximal at frH = 0, rL = 1g and minimal at frH = 1,
rL = 0g: hHU 2 [hHU , hHU ], where hHU ´ (1¡®p)=(2¡p) and hHU ´ [1¡ (1¡®)p]=(2¡p).
But ® > hHU and (1¡®) < hHU for all ® > 1=2. Since (VH ¡VL) > 0, we can then conclude
that ¦H > 0 and ¦L < 0 always. If an equilibrium exists, it must have rH = 1 and rL = 0.
(ii). Suppose rL 2 (0; 1) and ¦L = 0. Then, by (6), VL = 0, but since VH ¸ 1, VH > VL.
By (6) then ¦H > 0 and rH = 1. Suppose rL = 1 and ¦L > 0. Could it be that ¦H · 0? If
so, VH = 1 and VL = ±(1¡e¡1)(1¡®+aVL¡wr), or VL = ±(1¡e¡1)(1¡®¡wr)=(1¡±®) < 1
for all ± · 1 and wr ¸ 0. But if VH > VL it must be that ¦H > ¦L by (6), a contradiction.
Hence if rL = 1 and ¦L > 0, ¦H > 0 and rH = 1.
(iii) By constraints (12), signaling by either type of workers requires wC > wU for all
¸ > 0. But then, since ¯ > 1=2, the incentive to signal is always strictly higher for a H
worker than a L worker, and the conclusion follows.
(iv) If sH 2 (0; 1), then wr = wU = hHU(VH ¡ VL) + VL and ¦H = Á(VH ¡ VL)(®¡ hHU).
By result (iii) in the Lemma, if sH 2 (0; 1), then sL = 0, hence
hHU =
(1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p) (1¡ sH¯)
(1¡ rH®p¡ rL(1¡ ®)p) (1¡ sH¯) + (1¡ rH(1¡ ®)p¡ rL®p) : (A5)
It is then easy to verify that @hHU=@sH < 0, and since ® > hHU(sH = 0), a fortiori ® >
hHU(sH > 0), ¦H > 0 and rH = 1. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the proposition, it is su±cient to show the existence of
some such equilibrium. Consider the candidate scenario fsH = 1, sL = 0, rH = 1, rL = 1g,
where H workers in the market always signal but all ¯rms always prefer hiring through
referrals. Suppose ¯ = ®. (5), (6), (8), (9) and (9) yield VH , VL, ¦H , ¦L, wr, wU , and wC .
The incentive compatibility constraints (11) and (12) allow us to conclude that such scenario
is an equilibrium if and only if ¸ 2 [¸; ¸] where
¸ = maxf(1¡ ®)(1¡ hUH)
1¡ ±Á(2®¡ 1) ;
2®¡ 1 + (1¡ ®)hUH
1¡ ±Á(2®¡ 1) g
¸ =
®(1¡ hUH)
1¡ ±Á(2®¡ 1)
and, by (A5),
hUH =
1¡ ®
2¡ ®:
The unique upper bound is given by the requirement that ¸ should be low enough for H
workers to be willing to signal and the lower bounds by the incentive compatibility constraints
on the L workers and the L ¯rms (¸ should be high enough for L workers not to signal and
L ¯rms to prefer referrals.)28 It is not di±cult to verify that for all ® 2 (1=2; 1), ¸ is larger
than either of the two lower bounds (the relevant lower bound is the ¯rst for ® · 2 ¡ p2
and the second for higher ®). The incentive compatibility constraints are satis¯ed and the
scenario is an equilibrium for all ® 2 (1=2; 1). ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. The existence of equilibria where signaling is perfectly informative
has been established in Proposition 1. Consider now possible equilibria where referrals are
not used. By Lemma 1, if sH = sL = 0, then rH = 1; if sH 2 (0; 1), then rH = 1, and
if sL > 0, then sH = 1. Thus the only workers' strategies compatible with the absence of
referrals are fsH = 1, sL = 0g, fsH = 1, sL 2 (0; 1)g, and fsH = 1, sL = 1g. The ¯rst case is
the only one of the three possibilities where signaling is perfectly informative and referrals do
28If the incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that the L ¯rms' strategy is a best response is satis¯ed,
the equivalent constraint on H ¯rms is satis¯ed automatically.
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not take place. It was studied in detail in the text, and we showed there that the equilibrium
requires ¯ ¸ 2®=(1 + ®) > ® 8® 2 (1=2; 1), and thus is ruled out if ® = ¯. Proving that
the latter two candidate scenarios cannot be equilibria amounts once again to showing that
the incentive compatibility constraints must be violated. Deriving such constraints requires
working through the appropriate wage and pro¯ts equations for each scenario, but given (5),
(6), (8), (9) and (9) the derivation of the constraints is trivial, and we leave the details to
the reader. In the second scenario, fsH = 1, sL 2 (0; 1), rH = rL = 0g, the two binding
constraints are that L workers must be indi®erent about signaling, while H ¯rms must prefer
not to use referrals, or
¸ =
(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1¡ ±(1¡ e¡1)[®¡ (2¯ ¡ 1)hHC ¡ 2(1¡ ¯)hUC ] (A6)
¸ < ¯(hHC ¡ hHU) + hHU ¡ ® ´ ¸ (A7)
where
hHC =
¯
¯ + (1¡ ¯)sL
hHU =
1¡ ¯
1 + (1¡ ¯)(1¡ sL) :
For any given ¸, (A6) identi¯es the equilibrium sL, as long as (A7) is satis¯ed. Substituting
® = ¯ and (A7) in (A6), we can write
¸ =
(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1 + ±(1¡ e¡1)[(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)¡ ¸]
or
¸ >
(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)
1 + ±(1¡ e¡1)[(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)¡ ¸]
: (A8)
It is not di±cult to verify that for all sL 2 (0; 1), (1 ¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU) > ¸. Hence (A8)
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implies
±(1¡ e¡1)[(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)¡ ¸]¸ > [(1¡ ¯)(hHC ¡ hHU)¡ ¸];
a condition that can only be satis¯ed for ¸ > 1. But for all sL 2 (0; 1), hHC > hHU ,
implying ¸ < hHC ¡ ¯ < 1. The scenario cannot be an equilibrium when ® = ¯. In the
third scenario, fsH = 1, sL = 1, rH = rL = 0g, if H ¯rms do not use referrals it must be
that ¸ < ¯(2¯ ¡ 1) + 1¡ ¯ ¡ ®. If ® = ¯ the constraint becomes ¸ < (¯ ¡ 1)(2¯ ¡ 1) < 0,
which is violated for all ¸ > 0, ¯ 2 (1=2; 1).
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(a) Equilibrium Signalling
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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All the H and some L workers
All the H but no L workers
No worker
(b) Equilibrium Referral
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λ
All the ¯rms
All the H and some L ¯rms
All the H but no L ¯rms
Figure 1: (a) Equilibrium signaling and (b) referral in ®¡ ¸ space for ® = ¯ and ± = 0:90.
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(a) Equilibrium Signalling
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All the H and some L workers
All the H but no L workers
No worker
(b) Equilibrium Referral
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All the ¯rms
All the H and some L ¯rms
All the H but no L ¯rms
Some H ¯rms
No ¯rm
Figure 2: (a) Equilibrium signaling and (b) referral in ¯¡¸ space for ® = 0:75 and ± = 0:90.
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No referrals Positive Signalling
Figure 3: The space of parameters where equilibria without referrals exist (left) and where
equilibria with signaling exist (right). Darker grey correspond to informative signaling (sL =
0). ± = 0:90
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(a) Average market wage and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸
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(b) Market wage for certi¯ed and uncerti¯ed workers and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸
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(c) Average market wage for H and L workers and referral wage
For ¸ = 0:25, varying ¯ For ¯ = 0:75, varying ¸
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Figure 4: (a) Average market wage (black) and referral wage (gray). (b) Market wage for
certi¯ed workers (black, solid), market wage for uncerti¯ed workers (black, dashed), and
referral wage (gray). (c) Average market wage for H workers (black, solid), average market
wage for L workers (black, dashed), and referral wage (gray). Notice the multiple equilibria
in the ¯ = 0:75 ¯gures at high values of ¸. For all ¯gures ® = 0:75 and ± = 0:90.
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